INTRODUCTION
This Article probes whether the pretrial ruling in the British Petroleum (BP) oil spill multidistrict litigation (MDL), which denied that the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) displaces pre-OPA substantive maritime tort law, will prove durable in light of both the ruling's problematic character and four subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions that suggest the evolution of OPA jurisprudence will be more amenable to a pro-displacement outcome.
The principal trial plan defendants included BP, the § 2702 "responsible party," and, as general maritime law partial fault defendants, Transocean, the well driller, vessel owner-operator, and LLA petitioner; Halliburton, the well cementer; and Cameron, the manufacturer of the well's blowout preventer.
BJ Bundle's resolution of the displacement controversy significantly shaped the respective roles of OPA and maritime law in the subsequent trial. The trial's initial phase globally allocated fault and liability among the principal defendants and set the stage for various multibillion-dollar settlements between the defendants and the B] Bundle claimants, the five Gulf states, and the federal government both prior to and following the trial.
The MDL afforded a vehicle under which the actions transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana under 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) were limited to pretrial process only. Unlike the MDL action, however, the limitation action's transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) authorized trial in light of the consolidation and transfer of the claims originally filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The LLA's admiralty concursus affords a single forum to enjoin all pending suits and to compel them to be filed solely in the forum so that liability to all claimants may be determined and, if appropriate, limited.' The forum serves to determine whether the vessel and its owner may avoid liability altogether on lack of privity and knowledge grounds and whether the owner may limit its liability to the value of the vessel.' As occurred in the Transoceaninitiated LLA, moreover, litigants may also assert third-party actions of various kinds against one another.' Petitioners denied exoneration or limitation are subject to conventional maritime law tort liability, which may include both ordinary and, should the petitioner have engaged in gross negligence or willful misconduct, punitive damages.
The Ruling denied that OPA displaced the pre-OPA substantive general maritime law claims filed against BP but required instead that the general maritime law claims also covered by § 2702(b)(2) satisfy Louisiana). The LLA was brought under the Limitation of Liability Act. See 46 U.S.C. § § 30501-30512 (2012).
7.
See THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARrrTME LAW § 13-6 (6th ed.
2019).
8. See id. § 13-9.
9.
See id. § § 13-1 to -10.
[Vol. 93:511§ 2713's "presentment" requirement."o Specifically, it stated, "OPA does not displace general maritime law claims for those Plaintiffs who would have been able to bring such claims prior to OPA's enactment."" The claims in question are those that either comport with the requirement stated by the United States Supreme Court in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flintl 2 that claimants must suffer physical damage to their own property or qualify under the "commercial fisherman exception."" The court concluded that "OPA does displace general maritime law claims against Responsible Parties, but only with regard to procedure (i.e., OPA's presentment requirement),"l 4 such that general maritime claims may survive as long as they comport with OPA procedure.
B] Bundle asserts that presentment of a claim in the manner prescribed by § 2713 is essential to avoid OPA's displacement of maritime law because " [t] o allow a general maritime claim against the Responsible Party would serve to frustrate and circumvent the remedial scheme in OPA."" It premises this outcome on conflicting standards of liability in OPA and general maritime law, dissimilar limitation regimes, and the absence of OPA's presentment procedure in maritime law. B] Bundle ultimately grounds its non-displacement outcome on two Supreme Court non-OPA opinions: Exxon Shipping Co. v. Bakerl 6 and Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend." Under B] Bundle, pre-OPA maritime actions are separately pleadable post-OPA, existing alongside OPA's duplicative Robinsqualified damages action." Section 2702(b)(2)(B) allows a claim to be
10.
OPA provides that all claims for damages must be presented first to the responsible party or its guarantor. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a)-(b) (2012) . Then should the responsible party deny liability or fail to satisfy the claim within a defined period, the claimant may elect to either commence an action against the responsible party or its guarantor, or present the claim to an
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund established under § 2712. Id. 
11.

18.
The term "duplicative" in text speaks to the identity of the tortious injury under both § 2702(b)(2)(B) and maritime law, namely physical injury to property owned by the claimant or, viewed from a maritime law perspective, a Robins-qualified claim. For the source of and implications arising from the identity of the injury-loss or damage to the claimant-made for " [d] amages for injury to, or economic losses resulting from destruction of, real or personal property, which shall be recoverable by a claimant who owns or leases that property."l 9 In contrast, the Ruling instead focuses on § 2702(b)(2)(E), which enables an action for "pure economic loss" that cannot be pursued under maritime law because it is not premised on injury to the claimant's real or personal physical
property.
20
The court improperly equated OPA's coverage solely with the § 2702(b)(2)(E) "pure economic claims" and maritime law's coverage solely with Robins-qualified claims, thereby ignoring the gap-filling, pro-displacement implications of Congress's choice to address both categories of claims in OPA. 20. SeeBl Bundle, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 959,2011 AMC at 2240. Section 2702(b)(2)(E) provides for "[diamages equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant." 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E) (emphasis added).
21. The vast majority of the B1 Bundle claims failed to meet maritime law's Robinsqualified status, falling instead under § 2702(b)(2)(E) "pure economic claims" category. At least seven of the ten damage categories identified by the Deepwater Horizon Claims Center established under BP's settlement agreement with the PSC and 100,000-plus B1 Bundle claimants fail under Robins Dry Dock. 
B. A Roadmap for the Inquiry
In an article written after the Ruling but prior to the foregoing Fifth Circuit OPA opinions and the MDL/LLA trial, I questioned the Ruling's non-displacement posture on three principal grounds-two constitutional and one premised on § 2751 (e).
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The former includes conflict displacement, given the many discrepancies between the OPA and maritime law remedial regimes, and primacy displacement, which pairs the maritime remedial regime with OPA and its remedial regime. I concluded that OPA both duplicates maritime law's Robins-qualified cause of action, while extending its coverage and complexity well beyond and often in opposition to maritime law tenets. It then examines the Fifth Circuit panels' exegetical mode as a powerful tool for measuring the Ruling's twotrack model against the plain meaning of key OPA texts. The analysis highlights the Ruling's avoidance or marginalization of OPA's plain text, thereby supporting maritime law's displacement in the manner proposed in this Article.
Part 1 sets forth the pro-displacement thesis enriched by the MDL/LLA trial and the Fifth Circuit's contributions to the displacement dialogue. The analysis includes four distinct parts. The first lists a series of considerations that usefully define the playing field occupied by the displacement dispute. The second scales the scope of the displacement effect associated with the different rationales identified in this Article. The third briefly recounts the nature and root significance of the two-basket issue although the heavy lifting on this issue occurs in Part H's review of Settoon and further coverage in Appendix II. Of final concern is BI Bundle's reliance on the OPA/maritime law hybrid as an off-ramp for its candid admission that " [t] o allow a general maritime claim against the Responsible Party would serve to frustrate and circumvent the remedial scheme in OPA." 36 The proposed hybrid, so essential to overcoming the conflict displacement problem, is difficult to square with the plain language of § § 2702 and 2713 to the contrary.
Part IV scrutinizes the Ruling's deviation from OPA and the plain meaning of its most significant texts. In particular, this Part evaluates BI Bundle's extraction of four non-displacement themes from two Supreme Court opinions, Baker and Townsend, concluding that reliance on these two opinions to validate the two-track mode insufficiently grounds its decision.
Overall This Article posits that the Ruling's nondisplacement outcome may prove to be a one-off exercise explicable, ultimately, by the exigencies of the event and the court's disinclination to subordinate admiralty law to OPA." Nor can the two-track model flourish in a jurisprudence premised on fidelity to OPA as actually written, as the Fifth Circuit opinions reviewed in Part II demonstrate. The Article's conclusion enlarges upon both observations.
II. DISPLACEMENT RATIONALES
A.
Conflict and Primacy Displacement and the § 2 751(e) Proviso
OPA's displacement of maritime law finds substantial support in two well-defined constitutional doctrines 3 9 favoring congressional over judicial lawmaking and a third statutory test under the § 2751(e) proviso, which might more accurately be described as a mandatory choice of law provision directing OPA's nullification of maritime provisions when OPA provides otherwise.
1.
Conflict Displacement
The 
Primacy Displacement
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, the Supreme Court ruled that federal statutes displace federal common law when the statutes "speak directly to [the] question" engaged by common law.
4 2 This is known as primacy displacement. Section 2702(b)(2)(B), which B] Bundle denied displaced maritime law, precisely duplicates maritime law's Robins-qualified action. The Supreme Court's formulation prioritizes Congress's entitlement to displace an issue also addressed in judicially declared federal common law on the basis that "we are considering which branch of the Federal Government is the source of federal law, not whether that law pre-empts state law."' This rationale poses a less stringent burden than the preemption of state law standard by substituting displacement's "speaking directly" standard for preemption's requirement of proof that "Congress ha [s] affirmatively proscribed the use of federal common law."" It is enough that Congress has chosen to speak to the same matter that earlier or subsequently engaged the judiciary's attention. Outright discordance between the statutory and the common or maritime law competitors is not required. Although finding it unnecessary to rule on the issue, the appellate panel stressed that "we express no opinion on Defendants' argument that the OPA displaces general maritime law in this or any other case. '" 9 American Commercial Lines asked "whether OPA provides the exclusive source of law for an action involving a responsible party's liability for removal costs governed by OPA."" American Commercial Lines (ACL), a responsible party, insisted that both federal common law and general maritime law applied to reduce its liability in a subrogation action against it for sums that OPA's Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF) had earlier paid to its cleanup contractors under relevant provisions." Alleging the contractors' faulty performance, it sought to join them as third-party defendants or, alternatively, to hold them directly liable to the extent that it was found liable to the United States. 52 The Fifth Circuit approved the district court's analysis based on OPA as applied within the Fund's claims process, not the federal common or maritime law that predated OPA's process, 53 thereby contradicting B] Bundle's apparent restriction of OPA's displacement of maritime law to § 2713 presentment alone.
Settoon considered whether a "partial-fault" defendant-akin to the BP MDL's Halliburton or Transocean-bears liability in a responsible party's contribution action for purely economic damages. In re Deepwater Horizon rebuffed Louisiana's insistence that the BP blowout's damage to its waters and coastline was actionable under state law pursuant to maritime law's local police power exception per the Clean Water Act (CWA) and OPA state law savings clauses." In barring these claims, the Fifth Circuit panel stressed the dominion over federal oil pollution governance is shared by a triad of federal statutes: OPA, CWA, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).
6
All three appear in the panel's description of OPA's role in the triad as one of "prescrib[ing] a supplemental, comprehensive federal plan for handling oil spill responses, allocating responsibility among participants and prescribing reimbursement for cleanup costs and injuries," and of serving "as the law of the OCSLA point source .. . furnishing a comprehensive remedial regime for affected states' governmental and private claims.""
C. Guidelines for Resolving Displacement Claims
The Plain Meaning of OPA's Provisions Must Be Respected
"Statutory construction begins with the language of the statute," American Commercial Lines observed, "and, in the absence of ambiguity, often ends there."" Settoon concurred, having endorsed the "principle that we should apply the plain meaning of statutory language while considering its context in the overall enactment." 59 The The Ruling also denominates § 2751(e) as an admiralty savings clause 6 6 despite the clause's invalidation of admiralty and maritime norms that require outcomes that are otherwise than those prescribed elsewhere in OPA.
Congressional Primacy Requires Fidelity to Statutory Language and Context
Disputes involving federal statutes, federal common law, and maritime law often underscore tension between congressional and judicial lawmaking roles.
6 7 American Commercial Lines and Settoon faithfully observed the Supreme Court's caution that, "[e]ven in admiralty. . .where the federal judiciary's lawmaking power may well be at its strongest, it is [the judiciary's] duty to respect the will of Congress."' In rejecting the two-track model, American Commercial Lines warned that "courts cannot, without any textual warrant, expand the operation of savings clauses to modify the scope of displacement under OPA." 6 " It dampened judicial overreach by noting that "it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal law. Cir. 1982) ); see also Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'1 Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 15 (1981) (ruling that the CWA displaces the federal common law of nuisance in the ocean pollution sphere because "the absence of strong indicia of a contrary congressional intent" compels the conclusion "that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate"). therefore, contains its own internal choice of law provision excluding maritime norms that not only provide otherwise, but that simply trespass on OPA's province. The rationale employs several elements to divide pre-OPA maritime actions that survive OPA from those that do not. OPA does not cover every injury attributable to or concurrent with an oil discharge. Pre-OPA status continues post-OPA, for example, for personal injury, death, or collision injuries as claims that are not addressed in OPA. Section 2751(e), moreover, cuts both ways: it overrides maritime actions for injuries addressed by OPA but preserves those that are not addressed by the statute.
Settoon declared that reading the section as a one-way admiralty "savings clause" is contrary to its language and plain meaning.
90 Such an interpretation, it stated, "would transform the 'savings clause' into a supremacy clause by advancing general maritime law over the express provisions of the OPA"
91 American Commercial Lines warned that Section 2751(e) is not self-executing, however, because its implementation requires the identification and enrollment of the operative OPA provision that provides otherwise. This task requires determining whether the "implementing provision" speaks directly to the matter at hand. Unlike the proviso, the speaking directly standard does not require that the operative provision self-declare its exclusion of the maritime norm.
For American Commercial Lines, the implementing OPA provision was § 2712, which affords the "exclusive source of law" for challenges by responsible parties to OSLTF payments. Individually or collectively, the proviso and the speaking directly requirement contest the premise that OPA's "silence," defined as the lack of language in an OPA provision expressly declaring itself to override a specific maritime norm, leaves the latter intact. This premise runs directly counter to the speaking directly requirement, as American Commercial Lines held in rejecting ACL's factually correct challenge that OPA does not "explicitly" displace maritime law. 96 Even absent the benefit of the proviso's explicit override, Settoon and American Commercial Lines leave no doubt that silence might as easily justify displacement as non-displacement depending upon careful scrutiny of the statutory context and factual scenario in question. Under Settoon's primacy rationale, for example, it is sufficient that OPA speak to the same matter as the maritime principle. It may do so by precise duplication as in the instance of § 2702(b)(2)(B)'s mirroring of the maritime Robins-qualified marine tort. Or it may do so by responding to the same problem as that arising on the maritime side. In American Commercial Lines, for example, the party who unsuccessfully sought breach of contract relief under maritime contract law found that this route was displaced by OPA procedures directing it to secure relief before the agency administering OPA's OSLTF. 97
D. Gathering the Loose Ends
Elements of a Displacement Claim
Determining whether OPA displaces maritime law requires identifying both the element(s) of the federal common or maritime law being displaced and the displacement-inducing OPA provision(s). The displaced element in American Commercial Lines, for example, encompassed maritime or federal common law procedures for breach of contract claims. 98 The displacing elements were the OPA statutory provisions and associated regulations that address OPA subrogation
95.
See 859 
The Three Rationales
A rationale justifying exclusion of the maritime law route, remedy, or cause of action is imperative to ensure a disciplined and policy-appropriate displacement decision.
Hence, this subpart discusses three foregoing displacement rationales that, I believe, undermine B] Bundle's non-displacement posture and their confirmation and role in subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions.
Silence
The proviso and the "speaking directly" requirement clarify that OPA's silence regarding whether an OPA provision overrides a maritime norm hardly insures the maritime norm's survival. B] Bundle, therefore, does not advance its non-displacement position simply by declaring that "Congress knows how to proscribe punitive damages when it intends to." 0 3 Yes, the presence of such language will establish displacement. However, even without such explicit language, the combined effect of OPA's proviso and the ancillary OPA provision or language satisfying the "speaking directly" requirement will establish displacement, as in American Commercial Lines, where the court rejected ACL's challenge that OPA does not explicitly displace maritime law." OPA's § 2702(b)(2) damages inventory neatly traces the boundaries of OPA's coverage while portraying the sources of OPA-based liability with greater precision than causes of action or claims, both of which are derivative of the inventory in any event."
Finally, displacement's scope may be a product of the clustering of several OPA provisions whose displacing range will vary with their content. The provisions may do service on behalf of a lead provision, or, despite their greater autonomy, through combination with one another. The linkage between the § 2751(e) proviso and the OPA provision or provisions that implement this executory provision illustrate the lead provision alternative. The joinder option appears in the textually linked OPA provisions discussed in the following Part Three components of the argument in Part II merit additional attention: the likelihood that the § 2751 proviso rationale may exert greater influence than the other rationales in the evolution of prodisplacement OPA jurisprudence, the frailty of the OPA/maritime hybrid as an exit from maritime law's conflict, and the inroads on the Ruling's non-displacement claim activated by the "two-basket fallacy."
A. A Favored Role for the Proviso Rationale?
Unlike the conflict and primacy rationales, the § 2751(e) proviso rationale expressly declares the preclusion of maritime law norms when OPA otherwise provides, thereby eliminating complications associated with statutory silence. The proviso gauges congressional intent on the more objectively determinable compatibility of the maritime norm with the OPA provision. Given courts' preference for statutory over constitutional decision-making, moreover, future courts will appreciate that the proviso affords a statutory exit from the displacement dilemma, freeing them from the gravity and the uncertain gauges of the constitutionally based conflict and primacy rationales.
Likewise appealing is the proviso's reliance on § 2702(b)(2)(B)
as an implementing provision that speaks directly and unambiguously to the same matter as the pre-OPA maritime law Robins-qualified tort: namely, an action for "injury to, or economic losses resulting from destruction of, real or personal property, which shall be recoverable by a claimant who owns or leases that property. 
B. Mandatory OPA Presentment of Maritime Claims
Saving maritime law by tacking OPA presentment on the substantive maritime claim contravenes the plain language of the paired § § 2702 and 2713. Section 2702(a) addresses "removal costs and damages.""' Section 2702(b) inventories both these elements under the heading "Covered Removal Costs and Damages."ll 9 Section 2713(a) provides for presentation of "all claims for removal costs or damages" either to a responsible party or to an OPA 2714(a) guarantor.1 2 0 Section 2713(c) offers suitors, whose claims the responsible party has denied or failed to timely settle, the choice between commencing an action against the responsible party or the § 2714(a) guarantor and presenting the claim to the OSLTF.121
The plain meaning of the two provisions is evident on their face: OPA reserves presentment exclusively for OPA claims for removal costs and damages against OPA responsible parties. Any other outcome is contrary to not only the preceding provisions but also § 2702(a)'s uncompromising declaration of OPA's dominance 
33 U.S.C. § 2702(a).
Id § 2702(b).
120. Id § 2713(a).
Id. § 2713(c).
'all claims' and mandating that they 'shall' be presented first to the responsible party."' 2 2
Together, the language of the statute, its statutorily created terms of art, and its exclusivity immunize § § 2702
and 2713 from service in the manner proposed by the Ruling. The effort to do so recalls Settoon's rejection of a similar effort to subordinate § 2709's contribution language to the maritime regime:
"The short answer is that Congress did not write the statute that way. COMPLEX LITGATION (FOURTH) , supra note 37, § 10.1). However, even in a procedural context, for example, the court views § 2713 as imposing a "mandatory condition precedent" for claimants filing suit against responsible parties. Id at 964, 2011 AMC at 2248. The same imperative would seem no less appropriate for the section's more imposing express restriction of its use exclusively for OPA claims. If OPA displaces maritime Robins-qualified claims for economic and property damages, refusal to honor their displaced status as OPA claims would appear to clash with § 2702(b) because it abridges and modifies a substantive right of parties entitled to assert that right.
536
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THE BP MDL AND ITS AFTERMATH
American Commercial Lines, which more carefully attends to OPA's statutory structure, takes a strikingly different view of the matter in a passage observing that Congress designed a "carefully calibrated liability scheme with respect to specific remedies, 'the structure of [which] suggests that Congress intended for th[e] statutory remedies to be exclusive."'l 2 6 Nor can the statute's many other departures from maritime lawl 27 be ignored if the integrity of OPA's remedial regime is to be honored-the priority of which drove B] Bundle to combine OPA and maritime law in the first place.
128
C.
The "TEvo Baskets " Fallacy
The foregoing difficulties derive in part from an MDL Inaugural Trial Conference exchange among Judge Barbier, BP's counsel, and the PSC counsel. 129 The participants properly included the Robinsqualified claims in the maritime basket. However, they effectively excluded these claims from the OPA basket despite § 2702(b) (2) [Vol. 93:511
Conflict Preemption
Earlier discussion endorsed B] Bundle's concession that maritime law claims against an OPA responsible party may fail on conflict displacement grounds because, in language rooted in Baker, they would "frustrate ... the remedial scheme in OPA."l 36 The B] Bundle court paired these claims with OPA presentment to resolve the problem.
137
This Article disagrees with that decision, citing OPA's displacement of maritime law on several grounds previously detailed, including § 2713's reservation of its presentment requirement exclusively for OPA claims and the Ruling's failure to address the other maritime law differences it identified."' Nor does the Ruling credit the interface between conflict displacement and § 2751(e); namely, that to the extent that a maritime norm clashes with § 2713, it also frustrates an outcome that is faithful to OPA's express text.
The Timing Rule: Statutory Displacement of Established Maritime Principles
In ruling that a maritime maintenance and cure action for punitive damages survived the Jones Act, Townsend correctly noted that both the action and the remedy are well established in admiralty law, 139 a factor that B] Bundle stressed weighed heavily in Townsend's outcome.' 40 But not so heavily, the Supreme Court made clear, that the same result would have been obtained had "Congress ... enacted legislation departing from this common-law understanding."41 But analogizing OPA to the Jones Act is not easily defended. In the Supreme Court's assessment of the Jones Act, " [t] he only statute that could serve as a basis for overturning the common-law rule in this case,"l 4 2 it, like the B] Bundle court, had to determine whether a federal statute displaced federal common or maritime law. The Court ruled against Jones Act displacement on grounds that undermine B] Bundle's reliance on Townsend to defend the two-track ruling. The Jones Act expressly licenses the very two-track model that this Article rules out for OPA because § 30104(a) of the Jones Act endorses a choice of actions for seaman and endows them with a right to elect to bring a Jones Act claim.1 43 "Because the then-accepted remedies for injured seamen arose from general maritime law," Townsend clarified, "it necessarily follows that Congress was envisioning the continued availability of those common-law causes of action.""
In McBride, the Fifth Circuit severely downgraded the Townsend timing rule as a firm decisional rule.
145 Townsend had distinguished Miles v Apex Marine Corp., in which the Supreme Court held that the Jones Act precluded more expansive judicially conceived remedies for wrongful death or unseaworthiness than those in the Jones Act and the Death on the High Seas Act.
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Townsend's timing rule favored maritime law's long-established maintenance and cure and punitive damages doctrines, but not Miles's action for personal injury and death on Jones Act and unseaworthiness grounds, the same action pursued by the McBride plaintiffs.' Once Congress's lawmaking primacy is conceded, the timing rule becomes a useful, but hardly conclusive basis for resolving the displacement question. The overriding question goes to congressional intent, not to timing. In the BP MDL setting, allowing a maritime remedy to survive OPA because the maritime tort preceded the statute is puzzling when, unlike admiralty's maintenance and cure action, reforming oil pollution law's pervasive deficiencies pre-OPA and postExxon Valdez is uniformly recognized as OPA's raison d'6tre. Tanguis v. M/V Westchester nailed this point a decade prior to the Macondo spill in declaring that "[a]lthough traditional maritime remedies for oil spills pre-date OPA, OPA creates a new, comprehensive federal scheme for the recovery of oil spill cleanup costs and the compensation of those injured by such spills.""' 3. OPA's Failure to Occupy the Oil Pollution Remedial Field in its "Entirety"
In Baker, the Supreme Court rejected Exxon's claim that the CWA displaced maritime punitive damages because the statute lacks a "clear indication of congressional intent to occupy the entire field of pollution remedies." 152 B] Bundle followed suit, reasoning that insofar as § 2751(e) preserved maritime principles not banished by its proviso, OPA failed to occupy the entire field.
153
The non-displacement conclusion would be unassailable were field occupation the sole basis upon which displacement could be predicated. However, the Ruling itself recognizes that conflict displacement would have defeated maritime law's survival but for the A discussion of splitting causes of action and "silence" requires clarity in the use of the term damages, which may refer either to the category of injury envisaged (Damages 1) or the level of damages (Damages 2), and claims. In the case of an oil spill, for example, Damages 1 is illustrated by maritime law's pre-OPA Robins-qualified damages (as applicable to a claimant's physical property) or by § 2702(b)(2)'s inventory, which comprehends injuries to natural resources, one's physical property, subsistence uses, various public agency revenue losses and public service costs, and pure economic losses.
Levels of damages targeted by Damages 2 are two-fold: compensatory and punitive. Although derivative of an underlying cause of action, punitive damages do not themselves constitute an independent cause of action.
1 7 Baker points out, for example, that its entitlement to maritime punitive damages claim it addressed in the Exxon Valdez spill event was premised on Exxon's concession of its liability pursuant to the underlying marine pollution negligence action.' Absent the underlying claim, the Supreme Court's allocation of punitive damages on a one to one ratio of the amount of compensatory damages awarded for the underlying maritime oil pollution negligence cause of action would make no sense. Splitting a cause of action in this manner runs afoul of Baker, which thrashed Exxon's effort to defend against maritime punitive damages by conceding that CWA permits ordinary but not punitive damages for the Valdez oil spill. 6 o The Supreme Court explained, "nothing in the statutory text points to fragmenting the recovery scheme this way, and we have rejected similar attempts to sever remedies from their causes of action."' The BP MDL scenario is more objectionable still because different normative sources-OPA and maritime law-afford competing underlying causes of action for the two levels of damages at issue. Baker at least relied on the maritime negligence tort alone for both.
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The Supreme Court's recourse to Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.' Within the B] Bundle framework, both OPA and maritime law speak directly to the design of a remedial scheme for private economic and property losses resulting from marine oil discharges. More precisely, their joint concern focuses on a category of injury covering property owned or leased to the claimant, which is a matter as precisely defined in § 2702(b)(2)(B) as in maritime law's Robins-qualified tort.
Hence, devising a legal response to this injury is the matter to which the federal statute must "speak directly" and in fact does in both American Commercial Lines and Settoon.
While the statute must speak directly to the same matter, it need not give the same answer as the common law counterpart. Like American Commercial Lines, B] Bundle demonstrates that when the maritime response frustrates and circumvents the statutory response, the conflict rationale requires displacement.
17 5 But such conflict is not required under the primacy rationale under which displacement may occur, as Settoon demonstrates, even when OPA and the maritime rules address the same matter.
OPA's § 2751(e) proviso, moreover, concretely challenges maritime punitive damages application to OPA-covered marine oil spill actions. Unlike the constitutional speaking directly standard, the proviso expressly calls for preclusion of admiralty and general maritime law when OPA "otherwise provide [s] ." This executory provision requires the assistance of an implementing provision establishing that the "otherwise provide[s]" condition is satisfied.
Despite the Ruling's view that OPA and maritime law limitation schemes complement one another,' 7 6 § § 2701(3)-(5), 2704(a), and 2704(c)(1)(A) suggest otherwise. Section 2701(3)-(5) specifies that the sole Damages 2 level recognized in OPA is compensatory damages."' Section 2704(a) and (c)(1)(A), when read against this default compensatory damages rule, provides that the measure of a responsible party's recovery for gross negligence or willful misconduct 181. The catastrophe's costs and damages included contamination of 45,000 to 68,000 square miles of the Gulf's surface waters or the linear 1100 miles of its coastline; economic and environmental damage measured in the billions of dollars; a clean-up effort of some 3.1 million barrels of crude oil that engaged ninety federal agencies, 6000 vessels, 90,000 responders, and $14 billion in recovery costs; a five-month Gulf drilling moratorium; litigation costs on all sides that is likely without peer in this nation's legal experience; and billions of dollars more in oil spill damages awards, civil and criminal penalties, various multibilliondollar settlements and PSC common benefits awards. The Fifth Circuit's predisposition towards admiralty and general maritime law, or, as one Circuit judge put it respecting offshore rig drilling contracts, the Circuit's "reflexive invocation of admiralty jurisdiction" may also help explain the outcome 8 The predisposition is hardly surprising-navigation in the Mississippi's brown waters or the Gulf's blue waves, combined with the volume of offshore oil and gas operations in the Louisiana/Texas Gulf, are as iconic in the region as Louis Armstrong's trumpet and red beans and rice. Nor in this legal and economic culture is it surprising that the Supreme Court has felt it necessary to cut back on the Fifth Circuit's expansive view of admiralty jurisdiction in various landmark offshore drilling controversies. 1 8 6 Admiralty law's standing in the Gulf region's legal culture may also play out in another way anticipated by Professor Stephen Burbank, an early critic of the aggressive management of mass litigation.' He predicted "that if judges are to choose among policies extrinsic to the process of litigation, 'they will choose to advance those policies that are their special province and to subordinate those that are not.' 18 8 Admiralty law, of course, is that special province in the BP blowout locale.
The admiralty platform becomes more potent in consequence of the flexibility and direct engagement afforded MDL judges in this era of "managerial justice."l 8 9 Professor Francis McGovern has identified three advantages of managerial justice, each of which proved influential in the MDL/LLA process.' First is the observation that "[a]ny procedure-regardless of the nature of the underlying dispute or the method by which procedures are applied-will affect the outcome."
9 ' This observation illustrated by the efficacy of the LLA concursus procedure as integrated with the pertinent Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It also reveals the district court's restrained view of OPA's displacement of admiralty and maritime procedural law, which the court modified only in requiring that maritime claims satisfy OPA's presentment.
Decision makers seeking negotiated settlements, McGovern also advises, "can estimate the probability that nontraditional litigation management will bring about a more satisfactory outcome" by examining and, if need be, tweaking "the appropriate parties, the potential issues for discussion, and the information sufficient to determine a resolution."l 9 2 "Each of these variables," he adds, "is manipulable and can be organized or reorganized to enhance settlement potential." 1 93 The most graphic illustration of this advantage appears in the district court's denial of BP's effort to have the PSC's maritime damages claim dismissed on displacement grounds and its subsequent denial of BP's request to bring an interlocutory challenge to this ruling.
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Doing so enabled the PSC, the other defendants, and the federal government to forcefully target BP.'" It also created an incentive for BP and the partial fault defendants to settle rather than to risk the payment of extensive punitive damages to over 110,000 private plaintiffs and, for BP as the OPA responsible party subject to CWA civil penalties premised on gross negligence or willful misconduct, the addition of potentially billions more.
McGovern's third observation contends that, unlike the conventional judge, who functions as an umpire for contending counsel, "the [managerial] judge can be the most important player on As the managerial justice movement has matured, it is not unreasonable to ask whether the goal of expeditious settlement embraced by the Manual on Complex Litigation has not unsettled former modes and conceptions ofjudicial decision making in ways that bear on principle no less than on pragmatism. It would be naive not to anticipate that a good deal of bending of the rules-substantive and procedural-is an inevitable consequence of contemporary case management.
But are the assumed jurisprudential and process guardrails against the threat of the rules' outright fracture now themselves threatened by the undoubted fruits of expeditious settlement? May managerial efforts to alleviate the effects of largescale loss render judicial efforts "too big to fail" whatever the law, considered independently of the event's social or economic disruption, might otherwise seem to demand?
Perhaps so, particularly if judges reinstitute these guardrails for events of lesser magnitude, as I believe the Fifth Circuit's post-B1 Bundle rulings examined in this Article demonstrate. Withholding precedential status for federal district court decisions responsive to settlement priorities may serve to rationalize a trade-off in which the same foundational legal principle supports divergent outcomes depending upon the scope of a litigated event's economic and social disruption. 
) (E) Claims
The district court established a procedure by which claimants could file "Short-Form Joinders," which would simultaneously assert a claim in the limitation action as well as a joinder in the B 1 Master Complaint.
0
Complaints were filed on behalf of private plaintiffs asserting economic injuries arising from the "Short-Form Joinders," which allowed the concurrent assertion in the LLA of claims asserted in the MDL action. Oct. 25, 2016) . The claimants included individuals that suffered environmental and economic damages, some indeterminate number of whom qualify as Robins-qualified claimants. The appellants' brief described the nature of the claims and claimants filing under this procedure:
and claimants-in-limitation included businesses that suffered environmental and economic damages.
20 6 As such, these businesses and individuals would appear to hold some combination of Robinsunqualified claims (i.e., true pure economic claims, under § 2702(b)(2)(E), and Robins-qualified claims under § 2702(b)(2)(B)), which duplicate the pre-OPA maritime claims according to the court.
07
Under the District Court's guidance, and with the agreement of all parties, subsequent pre-trial orders allowed "Bl" ... Plaintiffs to join into both the Transocean Limitation Action as Claimants and to simultaneously assert claims against BP and the other defendants-who had been brought into the Limitation Action by Transocean pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c)-by joining consolidated BI and B3 Master Answers-in-Limitation, Claims-in-Limitation, and Complaints, via "Short Form Joinder" filings .... 
